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The Impact of the Unitary Patent and the Unified Patent Court on the 
Prevalence of Patent Trolls in the European Union  
By Sofia Kopelevich 
 
I. Introduction 
Patent protection in Europe has evolved over the years. Each patent system had its faults 
and was revised to the next system in hopes of overcoming the faults of its predecessor. Nowadays, 
an individual seeking to obtain patent protection in Europe has to select between two options: (1) 
a national patent, or (2) a European patent. Regardless of the option selected - obtaining and 
enforcing patent protection in several European countries results in significant procedural 
complexities and monetary investment. Thus, in an effort to simplify the process, cut the costs 
involved, unify patent enforcement, and promote innovation in the European Union (EU), 
regulations establishing a Unitary Patent (UP) and a Unified Patent Court (UPC) system were 
proposed. 
The proposed UP and UPC enhanced cooperation regulations present significant changes 
to the EU’s current patent system and are accompanied with concerns. Concerns regarding the 
upcoming system involve, inter alia, the costs of obtaining and keeping a UP; the experience of 
the judges that will be appointed to the UPC; and the applicable substantive and procedural law 
involved in enforcing the UP, such as the threshold for warranting preliminary injunctions and the 
discretion in bifurcating litigations to separate patent invalidity and patent infringement 
proceedings. The last concern mentioned is further supplemented with a fear that the UPC will 
fragment the EU and create “patentee friendly” divisions, thereby bolstering the effect of Non 
Practicing Entities (NPEs) in Europe. 
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NPEs are controversial participants in the global patent system. Although, NPEs may be 
characterized differently, this paper regards NPEs as intellectual property asset management firms 
whose exclusive business model is asserting patent claims to collect significant fees from 
companies operating in certain industries. Such firms are also known in the industry as “patent 
trolls”, “patent thickets”, “patent assertion entities,” and these terms may be used throughout the 
paper interchangeably.  
Many professionals and scholars believe that the “patent troll” problem is exclusive to the 
United States (US). This assertion, however, is mistaken as NPEs do attack companies and 
inventors in the EU, although far less frequently. The EU’s future UP and UPC system is very 
similar to the existing US patent system. The changes accompanying this future EU patent system 
may encourage more “patent trolls” to try their luck in the EU. Therefore, it is detrimental that all 
stakeholders propose and incorporate anti “patent trolls” clauses in the corresponding agreements 
and regulations.  
This paper will begin in part II by describing the European patent system as it is known 
today. Part III will discuss the challenges with the current system. Part IV will introduce the newly 
proposed supplemental patent system comprising of the UP and UPC. Subsequently, in part V, I 
will define NPEs, their business model, as well as their impact in the EU pre and post 
implementation of the UP and UPC system. Lastly, I will propose prophylactic legislative 
safeguards to minimize the presence of “patent trolls” and their harm in the UP and UPC system. 
II. The Current Patent System 
An individual seeking patent protection in the EU and in its member states (MSs) may 
pursue a few routes. Such individuals consider several factors when selecting the route that best 
fits their needs. The factors include: the type of invention claimed, the target market, the financial 
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investment, the return on investment and so forth. The routes that are currently available for future 
patent holders include pursuing national patent protection and/or pursuing a European patent 
described in part II(2). An additional option that is anticipated to become effective as of the end of 
2016 or beginning of 2017 is the UP described in part IV(1).1 
1. National Patent Protection 
 Obtaining national patent protection in a plurality of EU MSs can swiftly become a very 
expensive endeavor. Therefore, patent applicants often balance various factors and come up with 
a strategic solution that will best achieve their business goals. When such a strategic solution 
requires the invention to be patented in a small number of independent states, the patent applicant 
may find it more cost effective to file individual patent applications in each state of interest.2 This 
approach exists because each state, regardless of whether it is a MS of the EU, maintains some of 
its sovereignty in the area of national patent law.3  
 Acquiring national patent protection requires that the patent applicant file a separate patent 
application in each state of interest.4 No shortcuts are available and if the applicant is interested in 
a plurality of states, this route can become very time consuming, costly, and administratively 
complex.5  
A national patent gives the patent owner regional patent rights that are only valid in the 
state in which the patent was acquired.6 These rights cannot be asserted in any other country.7 
                                                          
1  12th meeting of the Preparatory Committee, (Oct. 19, 2015), available at http://unified-patent-court.org/news/97-
95-12th-meeting-of-the-preparatory-committee-19-october-2015. 
2 National Applications, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/applying/national.html (last updated 
Jun. 22, 2015). 
3 Id. 
4 David Medina, How The Unitary Patent Will Fragment European Patent Law, 47 Ariz. St. L. J. 319, 323 (2015) 
[hereinafter Medina]. 
5 Id. 
6 National Applications, supra note 2. 
7 Id. 
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National patent protection rights vary among the states and are governed by national laws which 
could be beneficial in some instances but harmful in others.8 
 To address some of the challenges that patent applicants are confronted with when they 
wish to obtain patent protection in a plurality of states, the European Patent route was established.  
2. The Classical European Patent 
Many European MSs wanted to strengthen co-operation and to simplify the process of 
obtaining a patent by creating a single procedure that applied among all participating states.9 These 
MSs became part of the European Patent Convention (EPC) in 1973.10 The EPC established a 
European Patent Organization comprising of a European Patent Office (EPO) and an 
Administrative Council.11 The Administrative Council oversees the EPO.12 The EPO is located in 
Munich and it is responsible for granting European Patents.13 The official languages of the EPO 
are English, French, and German, and all patent applications filed with the EPO have to be in one 
of the official languages or translated into one of the official languages to avoid its withdrawal.14 
Granting a European patent to a patent applicant involves several inquiries such as whether the 
subject matter is patentable, novel, inventive and industrially applicable.15  
Filing a patent application with the EPO automatically designates all EPC participating 
states (occasionally subject to the payment of a designation fee) as a potential state in which the 
                                                          
8 National Applications, supra note 2. 
9 Member states of the European Patent Organisation, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/about-
us/organisation/member-states.html (last updated Jul. 9, 2015) (AL, AT, BE, BG, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, 
FR, GB, GR, HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, LI, LT, LU, LV, MC, MK, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, RS, SE, SI, SK, SM, TR). 
10 European Patent Convention, art. PREAMBLE, Oct. 5, 1973, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, 
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/epc.html [hereinafter EPC].  
11 Id., at art. 4. 
12 Id. 
13 Id., at art. 6. 
14 Id., at art. 14. 
15 Id., at arts. 52-9. 
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European patent may be validated once it is granted. 16 In addition to the preliminary designation, 
once a European patent is granted, the applicant may choose to validate the patent in any one of 
the EPC designated participating states.17 To validate a patent in any particular state, the applicant 
has to fulfill certain national requirements.18 Some exemplary national requirements include 
translating the patent (or parts of it, e.g. the claims) into the national language and paying renewal 
or annuity fees.19 Upon validation, the national law of each state will govern the patent’s 
enforceability in that state. 20 
A granted European patent has a term of 20 years from the filing date of the application, 
thereby granting its owners the right to exclude others from engaging in infringing activities during 
the patent’s lifetime. 21  Infringing activities are dealt with in national courts,22 which may choose 
to request the EPO’s technical opinion on the subject matter at issue.23 The same standard of review 
applies when a national court reviews an infringement of a European patent or an infringement of 
a national patent.24  
III. Challenges with the Existing System 
The existing European patent system withstood the test of time and has proven its success 
decades after the implementation of the EPC.25 Nevertheless, stakeholders continue to face 
challenges with the current system; particularly after the European patent gets granted, also 
                                                          
16 EPC, supra note 10, at art. 79. 
17 Id., at art. 74. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id., at art. 63. 
22 Id., at art. 64. 
23 Id., at art. 25. 
24 Id., at art. 66. 
25 Stefan Luginbuehl, Unitary Patent Protection and Unified Patent Court, EPO.ORG, https://e-
courses.epo.org/mod/streaming/view.php?id=7188 (last visited Oct. 24, 2015) [hereinafter Luginbuehl]. 
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referred to as the “post grant” stage.26 Once the European patent gets granted, the applicant has to 
select in which of the previously designated states it wishes to validate the European patent, and 
follow each state’s national validation requirements.27 The validation requirements are not 
harmonized among all the states, creating an additional level of complexity.28 Additionally, the 
applicant has to file a translation of the granted European patent to each official language of the 
EPC participating states and pay separate renewal fees in each state they wish to validate in, 
thereby exacerbating the costs associated with the post grant procedure.29 
The cost, administrative burden, and complexity are further increased if the granted and 
validated patents get challenged in court. Validity and infringement proceedings occur 
independently in each national court pursuant to the governing national laws since there is no 
current harmonized patent court system, nor is there a harmonized patent law on the EU level.30 
While many national courts may rely on the EPC for guidance, they may also rely on judicially 
created laws in their particular nation which differ between states.31 Accordingly, patent owners 
have to contemplate various litigation strategies depending on which state the patent is being 
challenged or asserted in.32 Occasionally patent litigation may occur in multiple states 
simultaneously, thereby requiring the implementation of multiple strategies simultaneously in a 
plurality of jurisdictions while ensuring that the various strategies do not contradict or harm each 
other.33 One can envisage the undue burden such a scenario may pose on an applicant attempting 
to assert or defend their patent rights in today’s EU patent system. 
                                                          
26 Luginbuehl, supra note 25. 
27 EPC, supra note 10, at art. 74. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Luginbuehl, supra note 25. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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IV. The Newly Proporsed Patent System 
To cope with the various challenges presented by the existing system, a new EU unitary 
package comprising of a UP and a UPC were proposed.34 The EU’s unitary package is meant to 
strengthen the European patent even further,35 and make the access to the patent system easier, 
less costly, and legally secure.36 
1. The Unitary Patent 
On December 17, 2012, twenty-five EU MSs joined to enact two enhanced cooperation 
regulations, namely regulation 1257/2012 and 1260/2012, to establish a UP and agree on the 
official languages for the UP, respectively.37 The UP regulations provide substantive law as to the 
definition of the unitary effect, patent exhaustion,38 and the scope of licensing agreements.39 
The UP will have a unitary character in all participating states.40 It will be jointly granted 
in all participating states at once, but can also be jointly invalidated in all participating states at 
once.41 The UP will be a European patent granted by the EPO pursuant to the EPC and will have 
a uniform protection and equal effect in all twenty-five states that ratify the UP regulation.42 This 
                                                          
34 Luginbuehl, supra note 25. 
35 PREFACE BY THE PRESIDENT, EPC, supra note 10. 
36 Regulation 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2012 on Implementing 
Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 4 (EU) http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:32012R1257&qid=1442588116640&rid=1 [hereinafter Regulation 
1257/2012]. 
37 Medina, supra note 4, at 319. 
38 “Patent Exhaustion is a concept in patent law that limits a patentee’s monopoly over controlling when one can use 
or sell a patented technology. See generally Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625-26 
(2008). Once a patentee sells a patented technology to a consumer, the patentee can no longer sue to prevent that 
consumer from selling the patented technology to another consumer. Id.” Medina, supra note 4, at 328. 
39 Id. 
40 Participating states in the unitary patent agreement include Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at art. 3. 
41 Medina, supra note 4, at 328; also Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at art. 7. 
42 Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at (7). 
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“special agreement”43 intends to promote enhanced cooperation in the creation of a UP, allowing 
some MSs to adopt the UP immediately, and other MSs to opt in at a later stage.44 Although the 
UP regulation entered into force on January 20, 2013, and was signed by twenty-five MSs in 
Brussels on February 19, 2013, it will not become available until a UPC, tasked with enforcing the 
UP, becomes effective.45 
The UP seeks to simplify the administrative and financial burdens of the post grant 
procedures only.46 The process for obtaining a UP will be similar to that of obtaining a classical 
European patent described in Part II(2). This will include, inter alia, translation into two of the 
official languages,47 the same opposition period, the same appeal procedure, as well as the same 
examination criteria.48 Once a European Patent is granted, the applicant will have to explicitly 
request a UP. The UP will become immediately effective in all twenty-five participating states.49 
Such requests will also have a somewhat retroactive effect. This option will be available for new 
European patent applications filed after the UP regulation becomes effective as well as for 
European patent applications filed before the UP regulation becomes effective but only get granted 
after the UP regulation becomes effective.50 Thus, the UP will broaden the possibilities for 
applicants who currently have pending patent applications with the EPO. 
                                                          
43 The idea that regulation 1257/2012 “constitutes a special agreement within the meaning of article 142 of the EPC.  
Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at (6). 
44 Luginbuehl, supra note 25. 
45 Id. 
46 Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at (7). 
47 The official languages are French, English, and German. Council Regulation 1260/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 89 
(EU), at art. 6, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:32012R1260&qid=1442588116640&rid=4 [hereinafter Regulation 1260/2012]. 
48 Luginbuehl, supra note 25. 
49 Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at (18). 
50 Id., at (8). 
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Furthermore, only MSs of the EU may participate in the UP agreement and not all thirty-
eight states who participate in the EPC.51 Therefore, applicants may request a UP for the twenty-
five participating states and a classical European patent for states that are part of the EPC but not 
part of the UP regulation (such as Italy, Norway, Switzerland).52 Applicants may not obtain a 
classical European patent on top of the UP in EU MSs that ratify the UP.53 However, applicants 
may have a UP in EU MSs that ratify the UP and a classical European patent in states that do not 
participate in the UP regulation.54 Some states may allow the privilege of obtaining a national 
patent in addition to a UP.55 Such a privilege is governed by national laws and may vary among 
the states.56  
Essentially the UP takes the “all or nothing” approach, wherein applicants either obtain 
patent rights in all participating states or in none of them.57 Withdrawing from a single state results 
in withdrawal of the UP from all states.58 However, since obtaining a European patent depends on 
whether the claimed invention was invented or filed first (depending on whether it is a “first to 
file” or “first to invent” jurisdiction); what happens if the European UP is the first such invention 
in twenty-four states, but in the twenty-fifth state, a national patent on a similar invention already 
exists thereby invalidating the European UP in that particular state? Does the UP as a whole with 
respect to all 25 states get invalidated? It seems that the answer is uncertain but it could fall under 
one of the following two options: (1) the entire UP as a whole will get invalidated; or (2) the 
applicant will be able to opt out of the UP and apply for a classical European patent which may be 
                                                          
51 Luginbuehl, supra note 25. 
52 Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at (26). 
53 Id., at (8) & (26). 
54 Id. 
55 Id., at (26). 
56 Id. 
57 Id., at (26) & art. 3(2). 
58 Id. 
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validated in individual states pursuant to the applicant’s selection.59 If option two becomes the 
rule, will it only apply for a limited time period after the grant of the European patent60 or will it 
apply long after the UP is granted as a mitigation tool in case the UP gets invalidated in litigation? 
The answer here will likely be the former, limiting the opt out period, since any litigation at a later 
stage will be addressed at the specialized patent court which should apply a harmonized law and 
have a harmonized effect across all states. 
2. The Unified Patent Court 
The UPC is an additional vital component of the EU unitary package, which was adopted 
as a third provision61 about two months after the enactment of the UP regulations.62 The UPC will 
have exclusive jurisdiction over UP infringement and UP invalidity proceedings, supplementary 
protection certificate infringement, provisional and protective measures, damages and injunctions 
remedies, and appeals against the EPO’s decisions with respect to the UP.63 The UPC agreement 
provides guidance to UPC judges as to the substantive law related to direct infringement, indirect 
infringement, exceptions to infringement, patent exhaustion, revocation of a patent, and 
injunctions.64 The UPC’s institutional hierarchy will comprise of courts of first instance, a court 
of appeals, and the court of justice of the European Union.65  
                                                          
59 Luginbuehl, supra note 25. 
60 For example, for the opposition time period. The opposition time period extends for nine months after the grant of 
the European Patent, during which any party who wishes to challenge the validity of the patent may do so with the 
EPO. After nine months lapse, a party wishing to challenge the validity of the patent may only do so through the 
court system. Luginbuehl, supra note 25. 
61 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, Feb. 19, 2013, 2013 O.J. (C 175) 1, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:42013A0620%2801%29&qid=1442588116640&rid=3 [hereinafter 
UPC Agreement]. 
62 Medina, supra note 4, at 320. 
63 UPC Agreement, supra note 61, art. 32. 
64 Medina, supra note 4, at 328. 
65 UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 6. 
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Courts of first instance will include local and regional divisions in the various contracting 
states, with a central division for general patent matters in Paris, a pharmaceutical division in 
London, and an engineering division in Munich.66 The specialized divisions in Paris, London, and 
Munich will be run by several states ensuring a harmonized law.67 The number of courts of first 
instance divisions in each state will depend on the case workload, wherein increased workload in 
a particular state will render the establishment of additional divisions in that state while ensuring 
that the number of divisions does not exceed four per state.68  
The court of appeals will be located in Luxembourg.69 As with all national courts, the courts 
of first instance and the court of appeals may direct questions related to EU law interpretation to 
the Court of Justice of the EU and request for a preliminary ruling.70 The UPC further comprises 
a patent mediation and arbitration center located in Lisbon and in Ljubljana, and a training center 
for judges located in Budapest.71 
a. Choice of Law 
The UP and the UPC are independent enhanced cooperation regulations, wherein each of 
the MSs of the EU may choose to adopt one and not the other, not to adopt either, or to adopt both. 
Thus, four applicable patent laws may result once the UP regulations and UPC agreement become 
effective, namely: (1) classical European patents that do not adopt either regulation; (2) European 
UPs in countries that adopt the UP, but do not adopt the UPC; (3) Classical European patents in 
countries that adopt the UPC, but do not adopt the UP; and (4) European UPs in countries that 
adopt the UP and UPC.  
                                                          
66 UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 7. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id., at art. 9. 
70 Luginbuehl, supra note 25. 
71 UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 35. 
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The first applicable law for states that refuse to adopt either the UP regulations or the UPC 
agreement represents the current situation, the status quo.72 Under this category, the governing law 
will remain national patent law along with the current version of a classical European patent 
system.73 An exemplary state that falls under this category is Spain.74 
The governing law in states that ratify the UP regulations but not the UPC will likely be a 
combination of existing national law and the laws set out in the UP regulations.75 This category is 
unique because the EU Parliament, Commission, and Council did not anticipate any of the states 
to take this path, and even withheld the application of the UP until a complementary UPC system 
becomes effective.76 Nevertheless, some states fall under this category.77 However, the UP 
regulations are not comprehensive and do not recite the rights to which a patent holder will be 
entitled, lending themselves to be indirectly governed by the laws of the UPC even if a particular 
state does not ratify the UPC agreement.78 Additionally, patent disputes, such as patent 
infringement suits, will be either brought in front of a national court (if the infringement occurs in 
a non-UPC state) or in front of a UPC court (if infringement occurs in a UPC state), and will likely 
apply UPC law.79 An exemplary state that falls under this category is Poland.80 
                                                          
72 Medina, supra note 4, at 329. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Regulation 1257/2012, supra note 36, at (9). 
76Id., at (25). 
77 Medina, supra note 4, at 329. 
78 Id., at 331, for the idea that “Article 5(2) required that the scope of patent holder rights “shall be uniform in all 
participating Member States.” For the enhanced cooperation regulations to work, all countries that ratify the 
regulation must have the same patent holder rights. . . the Unified Patent Court agreement will serve as the de facto 
source for patent holder rights. Therefore, countries that do not ratify the Unified Patent Court agreement will likely 
be forced to provide patent holders the rights listed in the Unified Patent Court agreement, or risk violating Article 
5(2) of the Enhanced Cooperation Regulation.” 
79 Id., at 329-31. 
80 Id., at 329. 
 
 
14 
 
The governing law for states that ratify the UPC agreement but not the UP regulations will 
be the laws set out in the UPC agreement.81 Patent dispute suits involving national patents82 will 
be raised in a national court, whereas patent disputes involving classical European patents will be 
reviewed in the UPC which will have exclusive jurisdiction over both classical and UP disputes.83 
An exemplary state that falls under this category is Italy.84 
In states that ratify both the UP regulations and the UPC agreement,85 the UPC will have 
exclusive jurisdiction over both classical European patent disputes and UP disputes while national 
courts will retain jurisdiction over disputes arising from national patents.86 The governing laws 
will be those set out in the UPC agreement and the UP regulations.87 Exemplary states are all 
twenty-five EU MSs that ratify the UP regulations and the UPC agreement.88 Any of the three 
remaining MSs discloses above, such as Spain, Poland, and Italy, may opt in at a later stage.89  
b. Existing Concerns with the Establishment of the Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court  
 The EU unitary package raised many concerns among stakeholders in the patent 
community. How will judges for the UPC be chosen?90 Will the judges have proper experience in 
the patent sphere and in the particular technical areas at issue?91 How will litigation proceedings 
run? Will invalidity and infringement proceedings be combined or bifurcated?92 What will be the 
                                                          
81 The UPC agreement provides UPC judges guidance as to the substantive law related to direct infringement, 
indirect infringement, exceptions to infringement, patent exhaustion, revocation of a patent, and injunctions. UPC 
Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 19. 
82 National patent are independently applied for in each state. National Applications, supra note 2. 
83 Medina, supra note 4, at 329. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id., at 329, 336. 
87 Id., at 329. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 James Nurton, How to make the unitary patent work, 227 Managing Intell. Prop. 4 (2013) [hereinafter Nurton]. 
91 Id. 
92 D. Rose & C. Forsyth, The Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court: An Overview (2015), available at 
http://www.kwm.com/en/uk/knowledge/insights/the-new-eu-patent-package-20130601#.Vfwo7SYW6Jk.email 
[hereinafter Rose]. 
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standard for preliminary injunctions?93 Will the variation in applicable law fragment the European 
patent system?94 Will the new system add complexity and costs?95 Will the new system attract 
NPEs?96  
Although not a comprehensive list, these questions illustrate the ongoing struggle of 
everyone involved with adopting the new system and may somewhat explain the delay in its 
adoption (a shift from the original estimate of 2014 to the current estimate of 2017).97 Some of the 
questions will be addressed briefly below, with a more detailed discussion regarding the impact of 
the new system on the prevalence of NPEs in the EU. 
i. Procedures for Appointing Judges 
All divisions of the courts of first instance will have multi-national panels with three judges 
drawn from at least two different contracting member states.98 The judges may be legally qualified 
and/or technically qualified, with the technically qualified judges being present on the panel 
primarily to educate the non-technical judges on counterclaims of invalidity in infringement cases 
to determine the need for a bifurcated trial.99 The legally qualified judges will possess the 
qualifications required to become judges in a national court.100 The technically qualified judges 
will have a university degree in a technical field, some technical experience, and familiarity with 
                                                          
93 L.Mueller & M. Modiano, Patent Trolls: A View from Europe, (Feb. 24, 2014), available at 
https://bricwallblog.wordpress.com/2014/02/24/patent-trolls-a-view-from-europe/ [hereinafter Mueller]. 
94 Medina, supra note 4. 
95 Rose, supra note 92. 
96 Mueller, supra note 93. 
97 12th meeting of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1. 
98 Rose, supra note 92; also UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 8. 
99 UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 8. 
100 Unified Patent Court, UNIFIED-PATENT-COURT.ORG, available at http://unified-patent-court.org/about-the-
upc/14-category-a (last visited Oct. 24, 2015) [hereinafter UPC]; also UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 15. 
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the legal and procedural aspects of patent litigation.101 All judges will have to be in “good 
command” of at least one of the official languages of the EPO.102 
The judges will be selected from a list of candidates who show interest and are found 
compatible through a review of the UPC’s Advisory Committee.103 Candidates considered 
compatible by the UPC’s Advisory Committee will include patent judges and practitioners in 
patent law and patent litigation.104 Although the judges’ selection process seems promising, 
stakeholders are concerned that simply providing for a multi-national panel of judges may not be 
enough because the need is to not only have diversity of views but also experience in the subject 
matter.105 To ensure that experienced judges are appointed to the different courts in the UPC, 
judges from busy courts such as Germany, UK, and the Netherlands would be preferable, but their 
number is limited and some of them may not even apply.106 It is particularly important to have 
experienced judges in the court of appeals.107 However, as previously stated, the court of appeals 
is located in Luxembourg, making it somewhat uncertain whether the court’s location will deter 
experienced patent judges from seeking appointment there.108 
ii. Litigation Proceedings (Preliminary Injunctions and Bifurcation) 
 Whether the UPC divisions will bifurcate litigation proceedings to separate patent validity 
and infringement claims is an ongoing debate. Should the UPC resolve the entire case in a single 
proceeding, following the practice of Italy and the UK?109 Or should the UPC bifurcate each 
proceeding into two separate trials (one for patent validity determination, and one for infringement 
                                                          
101 UPC, supra note 100; also UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 15. 
102 Id. 
103 UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 16. 
104 Id. 
105 Nurton, supra note 90. 
106 Id. 
107 Kevin Mooney, An Insider’s View of the UPC, 228 Managing Intell. Prop. 29 (2013) [hereinafter Mooney]. 
108 Id. 
109 Luginbuehl, supra note 25. 
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determination) following the practice of Austria, Germany, and the Czech Republic?110 Currently 
there are no clear guidelines giving local and regional divisions discretion to decide on a case by 
case basis whether to bifurcate.111 
 Local and regional divisions, based on the complexity of each case and on whether a 
validity counterclaim was made, have three options to choose from: (1) hold a trial on all issues 
(infringement and validity); (2) bifurcate the trial into a validity and an infringement proceeding, 
refer the validity proceeding to the central division in Paris, and either suspend the infringement 
proceeding if there is a high likelihood that the relevant claims of the patent are invalid, or proceed 
with the infringement proceeding; or (3) refer the case as a whole to the central division in Paris.112 
The UPC rules also include a provision for option (2) reciting that when the infringement 
proceeding is not suspended, the central division will accelerate the date of the validity proceeding 
so that a validity decision can be made before the infringement proceeding takes place.113 The 
feasibility of this provision remains to be seen.  
In the meantime, defendants are very concerned about the implications of placing such 
discretionary power with the UPC.114 Plaintiffs may choose to argue their cases broadly, thereby 
easily obtaining preliminary injunctions relying on weak patents that may be found to be invalid 
during a narrow invalidity proceeding.115 The concern is that local and regional divisions in states 
that used the bifurcation system may continue to bifurcate and become the venue of choice for 
plaintiffs who seek to take advantage of this system, such as NPEs.116 This can result in undue 
burden to the defendant that in some instances may be enough to bring the defendant to bankruptcy. 
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V. Non Practicing Entities 
NPEs, also known as “patent trolls”, “patent thickets”, and “patent assertion entities,” are 
defined as “IP asset management firms whose exclusive business is asserting patent claims to 
collect significant fees from companies operating in certain industries.”117 The business model of 
NPEs consists of a few main steps, namely: acquiring patents in certain industries,118 waiting for 
a potential infringer to make an irreversible investment in a potentially infringing technology, and 
asserting the acquired patent against the potential infringer to extract money from them.119 As 
such, NPEs do not use their patents in the market and do not get involved in any research or 
development of the technology or products related to their patent portfolio.120 Furthermore, NPEs 
do not help with “technology transfer.”121 Instead, NPEs form their patent portfolio by purchasing 
patents from a plurality of sources, including small and large companies, bankrupt companies, 
start-ups, solo inventors, hospitals, universities, and even the government.122 This arrangement 
allows NPEs to take advantage of their non-practicing status by asserting their patents against 
potential infringers without being vulnerable to infringement counter-claims123 or bearing 
research, development and manufacturing costs. 
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NPE’s business model follows this typical sequence of events. After the NPE acquires a 
patent, it seeks out a potential infringer. Once it identifies such infringer, the NPE will often wait 
for the potential infringer to make an irreversible investment in the technology and become highly 
dependent financially on that technology.124 The NPE will then send the potential infringer a cease 
and desist letter accusing the company of infringing one or more of its acquired patents. The 
potential infringer will have three options of how to respond to the NPE threat: (1) cease 
infringement and risk bankruptcy because their company is now financially dependent on that 
particular technology to survive; (2) litigate in court to either show that the patent the NPE is 
attempting to assert is weak and invalid, or that the company is not infringing on the patent asserted 
against them; or (3) surrender to the threat, avoid litigation, and pay royalties to the NPE to 
continue using the technology.125 Due to the high stakes involved with options (1) and (2), i.e. 
bankruptcy and costly litigation with an uncertain outcome, companies often resort to the third 
option.126 In fact, this practice has gotten so prevalent in the United States that companies coined 
the term – “NPE tax.”127  
1. The Threat of NPEs 
The consequences of NPEs’ threats and lawsuits could be devastating not only to the 
companies under attack, but also to society as a whole. The purpose of patents is to foster 
innovation. That notion is rooted in our society as can be seen from the language of the United 
States Constitution, which grants Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts by securing, for limited times, to . . . inventors, the exclusive right to their . . . 
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discoveries.”128 This concept is not restricted solely to the United States, as the EPC provides in 
the preamble: 
“the contracting states to the European Patent Convention . . . 
wishing to promote innovation and economic growth in Europe still 
more effectively by laying foundations for the further development 
of the European Patent System . . . have agreed [to adopt the 
European Patent Convention’s provisions].”129  
The idea of promoting innovation through patent protection, emphasized both in the United States 
and in Europe, requires inventors to be motivated and have the right to research, develop, and 
invent, and then be able to patent the fruits of their labor and recoup their investment without an 
impeding threat that some immoral practice will preclude them from this right.  
The prevalence of NPEs discourages inventors from researching and developing in 
particular technologies where NPEs are more present and likely to attack.130 It further discourages 
inventors from disclosing their inventions to the public, thereby keeping inventions as trade 
secrets.131 As a result, certain trade secrets that could be used by other innovators to develop other 
inventions, become inaccessible, thereby suppressing and delaying overall innovation.132 NPEs 
have added significant costs to the innovation ecosystem, with very little of that cost actually 
recirculating back into innovation.133 The social implications of NPEs are real. NPEs currently 
seem to be a creature of the U.S. economy more than that of Europe’s economy.134 Nevertheless, 
NPEs may play a greater role with Europe’s upcoming unitary package system.135 
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a. The Threat of NPEs in Pre EU Unitary Package System 
Patent troll activity does occur in Europe even with the patent system that is currently in 
place. The activity is most prevalent in Germany, and less so in France, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands,136 Sweden, Italy, Norway, and Ireland137. For example, in Germany between 2000 
and 2008, data about the number of infringement cases revealed about 8,800 infringement suits, 
or slightly less than a 1000 infringement suits a year.138 Germany has far more infringement suits 
filed annually than any other EU MS.139 To illustrate the large disparity, similar data was collected 
in the UK between 2000-2008 and resulted in the finding of about 250 infringement cases, or less 
than 30 infringement suits a year.140 In comparison, NPE activity in the United States in 2012 alone 
accounted for 62% of all patent suits (about 2,500 patent assertion lawsuits by NPEs out of about 
4000 patent assertion lawsuits overall).141 NPEs are present in Europe and the number of NPE 
attacks is on the rise.142 Even though presently, United States remains in the lead with regard to 
NPEs, with the future unitary system, NPEs may become a more serious concern in the EU than 
they have been thus far.143  
b. The threat of NPEs in post EU unitary package system 
As illustrated in Part V.1.a., the disparity between patent troll attacks in the various states 
of the EU is substantial. Such a great disparity naturally raises the question- “why is there such a 
great disparity?” The simple answer is that patent trolls seek to assert their patents in jurisdictions 
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which have “patentee friendly” laws and procedures. But what makes a jurisdiction “patentee 
friendly?” 
The differences between the German and United Kingdom patent systems are numerous in 
number, with each factor playing a role in Germany’s “patentee friendly” status. First, Germany 
uses a bifurcated system whereas the UK does not.144 Based on the bifurcated system, it is possible 
for a regional court in Germany to grant an injunction against a potential infringer of a patent that 
is later found invalid.145 Additionally, the bifurcated system gives rise to inconsistencies in claim 
interpretation, since the different courts, resolving separate issues of infringement and validity, 
construct the claims independently.146 This creates a problem where a court, reviewing the claims 
for infringement purposes, will issue an injunction against a defendant on the basis of a broad 
claim construction, and simultaneously a court, reviewing the claims for validity purpose, will 
interpret the claims narrowly, finding the patent asserted for injunctions purposes invalid.147 
Second, in Germany, several regional courts are competent to hear patent cases, whereas 
in the UK, there is a centralized system for patent litigation.148 Thus, plaintiffs in Germany have 
several venues to choose from when filing an infringement claim.149 This enables patent trolls to 
forum shop to select the venue in which they are most likely to ultimately prevail or at least obtain 
a preliminary injunction. Such favorable venues are also known as “patentee friendly” courts.150 
Inventors that are faced with an infringement suit in a “patentee friendly” court are encouraged to 
settle with terms that are more favorable to the patent trolls.151 In contrast, in the UK the venue of 
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the lawsuit depends on the size and value of the claim and not on the plaintiff’s preference.152 
Furthermore, in the UK there are only two courts dedicated for patent litigation, and both are 
located in London.153 The reduced number of regional courts in the UK not only reduces forum 
shopping, but also allows for more uniform outcomes. 
Third, the duration of the proceeding in Germany is relatively speedy as compared to other 
EU MSs.154 This is possible, in large part, due to Germany’s bifurcated system, allowing Germany 
to enter judgments for patent infringement and preliminary injunction proceedings without 
reviewing the validity of the patent asserted. These differences in proceeding durations provide 
strategic incentives for patent trolls to file patent infringement suits in faster jurisdictions.155 
When reviewing the UPC agreement, keeping in mind the factors listed above for a 
“patentee friendly” jurisdiction, several provisions seem to be as problematic. Two of the UPC 
provisions are particularly controversial.156 The first provision is contained in Article 62(4) of the 
UPC agreement, which states: 
“The Court may, in respect of the measures referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 3, require the applicant to provide any reasonable 
evidence in order to satisfy itself with a sufficient degree of certainty 
that the applicant is the right holder and that the applicant's right is 
being infringed, or that such infringement is imminent.”157 
According to this provision, a patent troll may bring an infringement suit, requesting the court to 
grant a preliminary injunction, and the court may, at its discretion, require the patent troll plaintiff 
to provide “reasonable evidence” to show that the asserted patent is being infringed.158 The 
inclusion of the terms “may” and “reasonable evidence” provide uncertainty and a great amount 
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of discretion for regional and local divisions as to whether any evidence, whatsoever, is required 
to show that the asserted patent is being infringed, and if so, what will be considered as “reasonable 
evidence.”159 Some courts may set the standard so low that obtaining a preliminary injunction will 
be so simple, perhaps even too simple.160 These divisions will be termed as “patentee friendly” 
and targeted by patent trolls.161 
 The other controversial provision is Article 33(3) of the UPCA, which states: 
(3) A counterclaim for revocation as referred to in Article 32(1)(e) 
may be brought in the case of an action for infringement as referred 
to in Article 32(1)(a). The local or regional division concerned 
shall, after having heard the parties, have the discretion either 
to:  
(a) proceed with both the action for infringement and 
with the counterclaim for revocation and request the 
President of the Court of First Instance to allocate from the 
Pool of Judges in accordance with Article 18(3) a technically 
qualified judge with qualifications and experience in the 
field of technology concerned.  
(b) refer the counterclaim for revocation for decision to 
the central division and suspend or proceed with the action 
for infringement; or  
(c) with the agreement of the parties, refer the case for 
decision to the central division.162 
Article 33 determines the venue for an infringement proceeding. Specifically, and infringement 
proceeding may be brought either in the area where the infringer is located or where infringement 
occurs.163 However, if the potential infringer, against whom the patent is asserted, counterclaims 
with an invalidity claim, the local division has the discretion to choose whether to: (1) handle the 
entire case as a whole, (2) refer the counterclaim to the central division, or (3) refer the case as a 
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whole to the central division.164 Defendants who are reluctant to give such discretion to the court, 
may be hesitant to file a counterclaim due to the uncertainty involved.165  
Furthermore, if a local court decides, at its discretion, to bifurcate the case and refer the 
counter claim to the central division, they do not have to await the outcome of the counterclaim 
action, and may proceed with the infringement suit.166 This action will nullify the defensive effect 
of the counterclaim, thereby increasing the likelihood that the local division will find a potentially 
invalid patent infringed.167 The consequences of frequent use of option (2) may enable patent trolls 
to obtain favorable infringement judgment decisions on invalid patents resulting in devastating 
outcomes for innocent defendants and for society through harm to innovation and economic 
growth. 168 
2. Recommended Safeguards Against NPEs 
Researchers and law scholars have previously looked into the prevalence of patent trolls in 
the EU. Fusco concluded that patent trolls are active in the EU but to a lesser degree due to the 
smaller size of the industries prone to patent troll attacks in the EU as compared to the U.S.169 
Helmers, based on an empirical study, concluded that patent trolls are less active in the EU due to 
the deterrent effect of the fee shifting scheme present in the EU’s legal system.170 Even if Fusco 
was correct to correlate the size of an industry to the likelihood of attacks by NPEs, with an ever-
growing economy and developing technology, it is unlikely that the EU will stay far behind the 
US for much longer. Accordingly, measures have to be taken from the very start to ensure that 
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NPEs do not become more prevalent in the EU. These measures are especially urgent and vital in 
view of the upcoming changes to the patent system through the new EU unitary package.  
The new EU unitary package system greatly resembles the U.S. patent system. Therefore, 
the EU has the advantage of being able to learn from the history of U.S.’s struggle with patent 
trolls and adopt some of its strategies. Some of the measures recommended in the U.S. include 
granting clearer and stronger patents, which are less likely to be interpreted inconsistently among 
local and regional courts and reducing the disparity of litigation costs between patent owners and 
technology users.171 The litigation costs can be reduced, for example, by limiting unnecessary 
discovery of defendant’s documents at earlier stages yet requiring more evidence of patent validity 
and patent infringement by the NPEs before allowing an infringement suit to proceed. These 
measures have to be backed up with strong and clear rules of procedure that limit and reduce the 
discretion of the court to almost non-existent levels.172 Alternatively, the UPC agreement may list 
factors which the local and regional divisions will account for in making their discretionary 
decision, and the weight given to each factor, so that defendants are given sufficient notice and 
clear guidelines as to the best strategic move that will place them on a leveled playing field with 
the patent trolls. 
VI. Conclusion 
The current European patent system has proven its success over and over again for decades 
since at least the adoption of the EPC. Yet, nowadays, with the EU becoming gradually more and 
more uniform in all aspects, it seems that the EU, with the EU unitary package system, is striving 
to create uniformity in its patent system. And so, an unbroken patent system must be fixed making 
it simpler, inexpensive, and uniform. However, if the new patent system ironically simplifies by 
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complicating, becomes inexpensive with additional fees, and becomes uniform through 
fragmentation, has the nonexistent problem really been resolved? 
The UP system adds a third type of patent protection individuals may seek, the UP enforced 
in the UPC.173 It does not eliminate any of the existing patent options.174 Before, individuals only 
had to balance two strategies to determine which is favorable, now they will have to review their 
options under three potential strategies. To make things more complicated, the UP and UPC 
regulations are not available for all states who are part of the EPC, but only to MSs of the EU.175 
As a result, individuals will often have to resort to at least two types of patent protections to obtain 
comprehensive protection in all the jurisdictions they are interested in. Reviewing an additional 
strategic option as well as pursuing at least two types of patent protections, will naturally result in 
more expenditure. 
Additionally, it is hard enough to enforce uniform laws and uniform implementation of the 
laws in the U.S., where all states speak the same language. Imagine just how much more difficult 
it will be for the local and regional divisions of the UPC spread across many countries, run with 
different languages, accustomed to different laws, to follow UP laws in three official languages 
and implement them uniformly. With the lack of experience and fragmented institutions, the result 
is very likely to be a fragmented, not a unified, patent court. 
The weaknesses of the unitary system will be further exploited by patent trolls, who just 
try to leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort money out of them in a 
“legal” fashion. The only deterrent on patent trolls will be the fee shifting provision under which 
the losing party in the infringement suit will be responsible for all attorney fees.176 However, patent 
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trolls will adapt. They will select patentee friendly jurisdictions in the “fragmented patent court” 
and obtain speedy preliminary injunctions based on invalid or very weak patents.177 Defendants, 
particularly small and medium sized companies whose existence will be threatened through the 
patent troll infringement suit, will be too concerned that the patent trolls will threaten their entire 
UP to fall in all twenty-five jurisdictions, and will rush to settle or pay licensing fees to the 
prevailing patent trolls.178 Huge amounts of money will be taken away from the realm of 
innovation and economic growth in direct contrast to the purpose of the EPC.179 
Although this conclusion describes a horrifying scenario, absent proper measures, this may 
very well be part of our future. It is important for stakeholders to comprehend the potentially 
harmful consequences of the new system. Only by understanding the new system’s loopholes will 
future laws, whether through regulations, directives, or case law, depict informed decisions, 
provide clarity and guidance to defendants, and create deterrence to patent trolls. 
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